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The purpose of this dissertation is to explore the capital versus revenue distinction, within 
the scope of tax law. The discussion will begin by establishing the importance of the being 
able to ascertain what differentiates amounts of a capital nature from amounts of a revenue 
nature and the reason this subject still remains so controversial. In doing this, the 
dissertation will examine the South African tax law surrounding ordinary and capital gains 
tax, the introduction of capital gains in the South African tax system and its conceived 
effect on taxation in the country, at the time of its implementation.  
 
Next the subject of ascertaining the characteristics of an effective tax system will be 
addressed, with an emphasis on the most fundamental traits or maxims of taxation. With 
this in mind an examination of the correctness of the outcomes of two contentious cases, 
namely CSARS v Founders Hill (Pty) Ltd and CIR v Wyner will be undertaken to 
substantiate the controversial nature of the capital versus revenue distinction.  
 
Finally from the analysis of these cases and with reference to existing case law regarding 
the capital versus revenue distinction, this dissertation will conclude by discussing whether 
the contentious nature of the capital versus revenue distinction lessens the efficiency of a 















The distinction between what constitutes income of a capital nature and what does not has 
become an important and contentious feature, both in South African Tax law and within 
many other tax jurisdictions around the world. This issue is unique in comparison to many 
other parts of tax law in that there has been no legal definition given to amounts of a capital 
nature. The question which will be asked in this dissertation is, while taxation is a subject 
matter which is rousing by nature, why does this distinction remain so contentious?  
When referring to and when making the distinction between capital and revenue amounts in 
the Income Tax Act, 1962 (Act No. 58 of 1962) (‘The Act’), amounts are merely described 
as ‘of a capital nature’ or ‘not of a capital nature’ and there exists no guidance defining this 
term. In addition there is no one set of principles which can be used to distinguish taxable 
amounts of a capital nature from those of a revenue nature and for this reason, this area of 
tax law has become the subject of considerable litigation in previous years, both before the 
introduction of capital gains tax in South Africa and after it.   
This distinction is one which is important to both taxpayers and The South African 
Revenue Service (‘SARS’) alike, in that capital gains are taxed at a lower effective tax rate 
than income of a revenue nature and prior to the introduction of capital gains tax in South 
Africa, capital gains attracted no tax liability at all. The capital versus revenue distinction is 
also important in the set-off of tax losses because losses of a revenue nature can in most 
instances, barring certain ring-fencing provisions, be set-off against income which is either 













In a document issued by the National Treasury entitled ‘Briefing by the National Treasury’s 
Tax Policy Chief Directorate to the Portfolio and Select Committees on Finance’, in 2001 
on the subject of whether more certainty could be created in relation to the capital versus 
revenue distinction, it was noted that ‘according to the Commissioner, one in five cases 
litigated by SARS involves the capital versus ordinary [revenue] distinction’ and that 
‘written submissions to SARS rightly indicate that this case law distinction is vague, 
creating taxpayer uncertainty as well as needless litigation.’
1
 For these reasons the capital 
versus revenue distinction is still an important and relevant one within the realm of tax law 
however its significance begs the questions, why has the distinction remained so 
ambiguous, even after having being accompanied by so much litigation for so long?  
The cases of Founders Hill and Wyner will be examined, wherein the duty to make this 
distinction with regard to the nature of taxable income, was appealed to the Supreme Court 
of Appeal (‘the SCA’). In both cases the outcomes were contentious, for different reasons 
and so this dissertation will ask the questions; does the open-ended nature of the capital 
versus revenue distinction leave room to contest the correctness of cases which are tasked 
with distinguishing between amounts of a capital nature and those of a revenue nature?  
Following this, with certain maxims of taxation in mind, can it be said that the absence of a 
clear, precise distinction between revenue and capital amounts is detrimental to a tax 
system and if so, what can be done to correct this?  
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National Treasury ‘Capital Gains Tax In South Africa’ Briefing by the National Treasury’s Tax Policy Chief 
Directorate to the Portfolio and Select Committees on Finance, 24 January 2001 available at 













Capital Gains Tax in South Africa 
There were a number of reasons for the introduction of capital gains tax into South Africa’s 
tax system; capital gains tax had been a part of the tax regimes of many of the country’s 
with whom South Africa had traded for a number of years and so capital gains tax was 
instituted in South Africa for International Benchmarking purposes. In addition, capital 
gains tax was seen as a means of achieving horizontal equity in its taxation of the public, 
this required that members of the public of a similar socio-economic status should bear a 
similar tax burden. 
The incentive of taxpayers to shift their income from revenue to capital also played a role in 
the introduction of capital gains tax. Prior to its introduction, taxpayers would pay no tax on 
capital gains, this practice was both contrary to the principle of horizontal equity which the 
government was trying to achieve and created a loop-hole which tax payers could use to 
avoid paying tax. While the effective tax differential between capital gains and ordinary 
income still makes this attractive, the greater onus on taxpayers with regards to disclosure 
makes it harder to evade tax.
2
 
The words ‘of a capital nature’ can be found in several sections of the Income Tax Act 58 
of 1962 (‘the Act’) which governs income tax in South Africa. Most importantly this phrase 
can be found in s1 of the Act which defines, among other things the term ‘gross income’, 
which expressly excludes ‘receipts or accruals of a capital nature’ but includes certain 
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South African Revenue Service, ‘South African Revenue Service  Comprehensive Guide to Capital Gains 
Tax’, 2 November 2010 available at http://www.sars.gov.za/AllDocs/OpsDocs/Guides/LAPD-CGT-G01%20 
%20Comprehensive%20Guide%20to%20Capital%20Gains%20Tax%20-%20External%20Guide.pdf 













amounts ‘whether of a capital nature or not’. In addition the distinction between capital and 
revenue amounts is highlighted in the following parts of the Act;
3
 
‘s9C-which deems the amount received or accrued from the disposal of qualifying equity shares held 
for at least three years to be of a capital nature. s11(a)-which permits a deduction for expenditure and 
losses actually incurred in the production of income in carrying on a trade ‘provided such 
expenditure and losses are not of a capital nature’, 11(c) (deduction for certain legal expenses) – 
which limits the deduction to so much thereof as ‘is not of a capital nature, s24J(3) includes in gross 
income the amount of any interest determined under that section “whether or not that amount 
constitutes a receipt or accrual of a capital nature”’. 
The case law surrounding the capital versus revenue distinction is always changing and 
progressing, as is common in many aspects of tax law nonetheless there still exists a set of 
pioneering cases which are often cited in support or defense of a particular view.  
Any amounts which are not found to be subject to income tax are assessed according to 
capital gains tax rules, which are set out in the Act. In his 2012 budget speech, the Minister 
of Finance Pravin Gordhan announced an increase in the inclusion rate of capital gains, in 
taxable income. From 1 April 2012 individuals were to include 33, 3% of taxable capital 
gains in their taxable income, an increase from 25% in the previous year, while other 
taxpayers are now  to include 66.6% of their taxable capital gains in their taxable income, 










L Olivier ‘Capital Versus Revenue: Some Guidance’ (2012) De Jure 45 Volume 1 2012 available at 














The Characteristics of a Good Tax System 
The notion of what makes up a good tax system is one which is ever evolving, as 
economies expand in their scale and complexity so too do the requirements nations place on 
tax collectors and visa-versa. Despite this particular characteristics or ‘canons of taxation’, 
which were first introduced in Adam Smith’s renowned ‘The Wealth of Nations’ have long 
been considered fundamental to all tax systems regardless of their size or inimitability. 
Smith outlined four maxims of taxation which should apply to taxes in general, namely, 
equity, certainty, convenience and economy.
5
 
Equity in taxation refers to the ideal that citizens of a nation or state should contribute to 
that state in proportion to their economic ability to do so, that of certainty proposes that all 
taxpayers should be sure of the tax that they are liable to pay in respect of the time when 
they will be liable to pay, the manner of payment and the quantity to be paid. Finally Smith 
proposed convenience and economy as fundamental characteristics of an efficient tax 
system because he considered taxes should be levied in the same period that income is 
earned, in the interest of expedience and ease. He conceived of a tax system in which 
‘Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and to keep out of the pockets of the 
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Kalyan City Life ‘What are Canons of Taxation?’, available at http://kalyan-
city.blogspot.com/2010/12/what-is-tax-definition-adam-smith.html accessed on 15 June 2013 
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A Smith, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, 1904, available at 












It is evident, that while all of these traits are important they are inextricably connected, if 
taxes are uncertain to the public, they cannot be said to be economic or convenient, in that 
if there is a dispute with regard to a tax which has been levied the taxpayer may end up 
paying it long after they have earned the income which attracted the tax liability in the first 
place. As part of this research these canons of taxation will be examined with reference to 
the ambiguity which exists in discerning capital amounts for inclusion in taxable income, 
from revenue amounts to be included.  
Adam Smith said of the importance of certainty in a system of taxation: 
‘The tax which each individual is bound to pay ought to be certain, and not arbitrary. The time of 
payment, the manner of payment, the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear and plain to the 
contributor, and to every other person. Where it is otherwise, every person subject to the tax is put 
more or less in the power of the tax-gatherer, who can either aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious 




Certainty in a system of taxation is advantageous to both the taxpayer and the tax collector. 
While taxpayers are able to determine how much of their income will need to be allotted to 
paying tax, tax collectors are able to resolve how much tax they can expect to collect at any 
given time. This in turn allows for greater ease in facilitating the tax collection and payment 
process and generally a more efficient system of tax collection.  
Another important feature of a proficient tax system is that of simplicity, this is something 
which many tax regimes often pursue but very seldom achieve. Simplicity in the 
understanding of any system allows for a greater compliance rate, it provides less room for 
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 A Smith, ‘An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations’, 1904, available at 













obfuscation of facts to achieve a certain tax advantage and makes the task of monitoring tax 
compliance easier for tax collectors.
8
 
Other than the effect that not having these traits might have on the taxpayers and the tax 
collectors within a particular tax jurisdiction, another important consequence to consider, 
particularly within the realm of distinguishing capital amounts from their revenue 
counterparts, is that on foreign investment. Being one of the largest economies in Africa, 
South Africa has become a preferred investee among multinationals who want to expand 
their businesses in countries which have a lot of growth potential. Over the past few years 
while the rest of the world has remained in decline or stagnation South Africa and indeed 
Africa have continued to grow. Having uncertainties in the country’s taxation system is a 
signal to investors that despite our growth potential they may not realise their assets to their 
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Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (ITEP)‘ Tax Principles :Building Blocks of  
A Sound Tax System’, August 2011, available at http://www.ieanea.org/media/2012/02/Tax_principles.pdf 













AECI Ltd (AECI) was formed in 1924, borne out of a merger between British South Africa 
Explosives Company and Cape Explosive Works. The company had acquired large 
amounts of land in this process, to the extent of 4100 hectares (10131.32 acres). This land 
would serve predominantly as a buffer between the factory which was constructed on it and 
other occupied land. As technological advances came into play, the legal hurdles which 
AECI as an explosives company faced began to change. There came a time when AECI, no 
longer required the amount of land which it had acquired to surround its factory and AECI 
together with the Johannesburg City Council began a planning process in order to develop 
the land which AECI no longer had a need for.  Founders Hill was formed by AECI to 
serve as a realisation company, for the purposes of realising the excess land which AECI 
sought to dispose of. AECI subsequently sold the land to Founders Hill, who went on to 
develop and sell the land itself. 
9
 
Initially Founders Hill was not taxed on the sale of this land; however the Commissioner 
for the South African Revenue Service (‘the Commissioner’) issued revised assessments for 
both the 2000 and 2001 income tax years, claiming that the profits made on the sale of the 
land, did attract income tax liability as income of a revenue nature. In addition the 
Commissioner assessed the realisation company for interest on the amounts which were 
outstanding as a result of the revised assessments.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
interest which was charged by the Commissioner and considered before the court will not 
be discussed.  
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After a judgment of the Tax Court held that the profit earned on the sale of the above 
mentioned land was of a capital nature, the Commissioner appealed the finding to the SCA. 
It is the finding of this court and the reasons used to support this final decision that will be 
examined. 
Judgment:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The judgment laid down by the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the Tax Court 
judgment and held that the land which was sold by the taxpayer, Founders Hill was not of a 
capital nature. This judgment was underpinned by two principle suppositions made by the 
Judge, the first of which was that the sale of land from AECI to its realisation company, 
Founders Hill in order that Founders Hill would realise that land on behalf of AECI, 
amounted to a change in the nature of the land, from that of a capital asset in the hands of 
AECI to ‘stock-in-trade’ in the hands of Founders Hill. Secondly the assertion put forward 
by Counsel for the respondent, that the intention of Founders Hill to merely realise the land 
for its parent company AECI, was not accepted as being sufficient motive to warrant the 
interposition of a realisation company to facilitate the sale of the land. As a result of this, 
the facts in casu were distinguished from those found in the leading cases involving 
realisation companies, such as Berea West
10
 and as a result the principles laid down in 
Founders Hill diverge from those laid down in the aforementioned case too. This analysis 
shall identify each of the reasons behind the deductions which were made in the judgment 
and using existing case law, distinguish some discrepancies in the conclusions which were 
drawn in the judgment and this case law.  
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At the outset, it was common cause between the parties that Founders Hill had acted as 
AECI’s realisation company in selling the land which had been acquired from AECI and as 
such Founders Hill was subject to the same legal benefaction that had been assigned to 
other realisation companies in the leading reported cases. However despite there being no 
contention between the parties on this matter and there being ‘no dispute about the 
circumstances under which the sales, alleged to attract liability for income tax’
11
 occurred, 
this point was disputed when the matter was heard on appeal by the Commissioner to the 
SCA.  The Commissioner had contended in its appeal to the SCA, that Founders Hill had 
‘crossed the rubicon’, in its development and subsequent sale of the land it had acquired 
from AECI and as such, Founders Hill was liable for tax on the profits earned on the sale of 
this land in accordance with this. It was conceded in the judgement that, ‘[t]he parties ( and 
the tax court) thus both approached the matter on the supposition that the property was a 
capital asset in the hands of Founders Hill upon its acquisition, and that the question for 
determination was whether Founders Hill subsequently ‘crossed the Rubicon’ by starting to 
trade in the property’.
12
 The issue of what differentiates having realised an asset to its best 
advantage and having ‘crossed the Rubicon’ is discussed at length in the judgment but these 
principles are not applied to the facts of the case in particular detail. Instead what is seen as 
the proverbial nail in Founders Hills’ coffin is that the company was incorporated with the 
express intention of realising the land and as such this land is considered the stock-in-trade 
of Founders Hill by the Court.  
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CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 5[7]. 
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Following this, the question of what constitutes a realisation company and in fact whether 
Founders Hill met that definition is debated in the judgment. The facts in Founders Hill are 
distinguished from those of Malone and Berea West as the incorporation of Founders Hill 
as a realisation company does not create the ease of disposal which Lewis JA infers as a 
necessary ingredient in the interposition of a realisation company. This supposition begs the 
question, can Founders Hill be reasonably distinguished from both Malone and Berea West 
on this basis and if not, did Founders Hill acquire capital assets or stock-in-trade, in 
acquiring AECI’s land?  
The view taken by the Court was expressed as follows; 
 ‘As will be seen, Founders Hill purchased the property from AECI for the very purpose of 
developing and reselling it. And so the initial question in my view, is whether the property was 
acquired by it as stock-in-trade’
13
 
‘It [Founders Hill] was formed solely for the purpose of acquiring the property and then developing 
and selling it at a profit and I see no reason then why the property was not stock-in-trade’.
14
 
The Courts conclusion that the land which Founders Hill had acquired was stock-in-trade 
was rooted in its deduction that having acquired an asset for resale implied that what the 
taxpayer had acquired was floating capital. This view failed to take into consideration what 
is referred to by Eddie Broomberg SC, in his paper entitled ‘NWK and Founders Hill’ as 
the ‘rider to the golden rule, which is to the effect that there cannot be a trade without an 
intention to trade’
15
 This principle is set out in a number of cases which have established 
that where  actions have been taken to dispose of an asset in pursuance of an objective 
which exists independent of a profit-making objective, those actions are not legally seen as 
being in furtherance of a trade. This principle has been illustrated in the case of both Stott 
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CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 3[4]. 
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CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 22[53]. 
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and Paul, where the taxpayers in each instance had disposed of land which was surplus to 
their needs, just as Founders Hill had done. In both instances the Court found that in 
disposing of this land, the taxpayers’ principle objective had been to release themselves 
from the burden of holding land which was, for different reasons in each case, surplus to 
their requirements and not to begin trading in land. For this reason, the Courts in each 
instance took the view that the profit earned on the aforementioned disposal was capital in 
nature.  
While Founders Hill did acquire the land to sell, for the highest price possible, it at no time 
had an intention to trade. Upon examination of the commercial significance of the sale of 
land from AECI to Founders Hill, it is clear that any profit which was earned on the sale of 
the land would be allotted to the shareholders of Founders Hill. Since Founders Hill was a 
wholly owned subsidiary of AECI, these profits would accrue to the shareholders of AECI. 
The judgment laid down in Founders Hill relies heavily on the premise that the 
incorporation of the realisation company and the sale of land from AECI to Founders Hill 
amounted to an act which rendered the nature of the profits earned on sale of this land, 
different, than they would have been had the land been initially held and subsequently sold 
by AECI. The question was asked, ‘If the sole purpose of the transfer to the realisation 
company is so that it can realize the property, on what basis can it be said that it ever held it 
as capital?’
16
 The failure on the part of the Court to view the intention of the realisation 
company as being akin to its parent company is what opens the door for Lewis JA’s 
subsequent distinction between Founders Hills’ intention sell and AECI’s. To this Eddie 
Broomberg very succinctly points out,  
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‘Of course, when it comes to a holding company and a wholly owned subsidiary, it will be the same 
individuals who form the intention and purpose of both the holding company and the subsidiary. It is 
all the more important, therefore, to keep in mind that when those individual are acting as the board 
of directors of the subsidiary, they are forming the intention and purpose of the subsidiary. In the 
case of a realisation company, then the intention and purpose of the subsidiary in acquiring the asset 
in question will be to realize it on behalf of the parent company, and to account to the parent for the 
net proceeds. It [Founders Hill] had no profit motive on its own account.’
17
 
Following this, another distinction is made between the facts of Founders Hill and the 
reported cases on realisation companies, in that in casu the Judge asserted that there was no 
necessity motivating the interposition of a realisation company. Given that it was common 
cause between the parties that Founders Hill was a realisation company as had been 
envisaged in the reported cases, it was not required by Counsel for the respondent to lead 
any evidence on the matter. So when probed as to the motivation behind the interposition of 
the realisation company to facilitate the disposal of the land, by the Court, Counsel’s 
response that it had been legally advised to do so was interpreted as being an insufficient 
justification for its formation. This was expressed by the Judge as follows; 
‘[W]here the original holder of the assets could, without the interposition of a subsidiary company 
(the sole purpose of which is to realise what was in the former owner’s hands a capital asset), realise 
the assets itself, there could never be an intention on the part of the interposed entity to realise the 
property it has acquired as a capital asset. If the sole purpose of the transfer to the realization 




‘In my view an interposed realization company (or other entity) will stand in the shoes of the entity 
that has transferred assets to it, and hold them in turn as capital assets, only in special circumstances, 
exemplified in Holmes JA’s judgment in Berea West (where A, B and C hold shares in property and 
require a vehicle to sell them as advantageously as possible, as was the case in Berea West), or where 




As Lewis JA points out, ‘Special cases do not create general rules’.
20
 As such, how can an 
intention or motive to trade and realise the land in a scheme of profit-making, be inferred in 
the creation of a realisation company, as a result of there not having been any other reason 
                                                          
17
 Broomberg op cit (n14) [6] 
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 CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 18[42]. 
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 CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 19[44]. 
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for the incorporation of that company, other than to realise the assets of its parent 
company?  
The wording of Founders Hill’s Memorandum of Incorporation was in line with that which 
has come to be expected from a realisation company, namely,  
 
‘ “To acquire from AECI Limited certain properties situate at Modderfontein, Johannesburg which 
are held by AECI Limited as a capital asset and which have become surplus to its needs, for the sole 
purpose of realising same to best advantage and within a period of one year of completion of such 




This follows almost exactly from what was set out in Berea West as what constitutes the 
intention and purpose for the use of a realisation company in realising an asset,  
‘Suppose for example A, B and C own a tract of land, not having acquired it with a view to sale, and 
they wish to realise this capital asset: and they promote a company and become the exclusive 
shareholders: and they transfer the land to the company for the purpose of realizing the asset: and, 
when it has been sold, the company is to be wound up and its assets distributed among the 
shareholders. The company would be regarded as a realisation company, and not a company trading 
for profits, and the surplus would be regarded as a capital receipt; unless, of course, the company 
conducted itself as a business trading for profits’
22
 
Founders Hill’s activities followed with what was set out in its Memorandum of 
Incorporation in that it had acquired this land and realised it to its best advantage and 
subsequently sold it to third parties. It is difficult to justify how AECI’s sale of this land to 
another company, which it wholly owned, in order that it may be realised, could not be 
considered a sale to a realisation company merely because there were no hurdles to 
overcome in the disposal of the land. Holmes JA states in his judgment in the case of Berea 
West that a realisation company is not a company which trades for profit, it acts solely to 
realise an asset for the benefit of its shareholders. Thus the question for determination in a 
case such as Founders Hill is whether the realisation company’s intention is wholly in line 
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 CSARS v Founders Hill supra  (n9) at 6[11]. 
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with this or not and as such the reasons which prompt the use of a realisation company in 




The distinction between a company’s intention and its actions is an important and decisive 
one, as is correctly pointed out in the judgment, ‘Calling an entity a ‘realization company’ 
(and limiting its objects and restricting its selling activities in respect of the assets 
transferred to it), is not itself a magical act that inevitably makes the profits derived from 
the sale of the assets of a capital nature.’
24
 AECI no longer had need for the vast amount of 
land which it had accumulated and so in order to facilitate its disposal formed Founders 
Hill. In Founders Hill undertaking to dispose of the land, it developed and marketed it, in 
order to cater to the growing need for urbanisation in the area in which it was situated and 
any profits earned on disposal of this land were distributed to AECI. This follows on 
exactly with both Founders Hill’s Memorandum of Incorporation and the definition set out 
in Berea West of a realisation company. 
 
It is difficult to see why any difference exists between the two cases or why a legal line 
could be drawn between the two purely on the grounds that there was no purpose for the 
incorporation of the realisation company, other than to dispose of the land for the benefit of 
its parent company.  
Did Founders Hill Cross the Rubicon? 
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The judgment and indeed the finding in this case relied heavily on the premise that the 
transfer of land by sale from AECI to Founders Hill, in itself constituted a change in 
intention. For this reason, the assertion that Founders Hill, ‘crossed the Rubicon’ and had 
embarked on a scheme of profit-making was not considered, as Lewis JA stated: 
‘It is only if the property was acquired at the outset as a capital asset that a second question arises-the 
question that was considered by the court below-which is whether it thereafter “crossed the Rubicon” 
by commencing to engage in the business of trading in the property.’
25
 
While the sale of land from one company to a realisation company does not usually infer a 
change in intention, the realisation company may also ‘cross the Rubicon’ in its treatment 
of a capital asset. Acquisition of the land by Founders Hill, to develop was considered 
indicative of a change in AECI’s initial capital intention and was interpreted as an objective 
to use the land as its stock-in-trade. Various pieces of case law set out the guidelines for 
what is considered to be a change in intention from realising an asset to using it as stock for 
trading purposes.  
Circumstances which would deem the land acquired by Founders Hill stock-in-trade can be 
determined by assessing the extent to which the taxpayer had undertaken to develop the 
land for sale. Although a change in intention from the time between an entities initial 
acquisition of an asset and the time of its sale and the case law surrounding this, is 
discussed extensively in the judgment, it is not dealt with explicitly in relation to Founders 
Hill’s sale of land in the years of assessment in question.  
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The taxpayer had purchased a property, which she had previously leased for R802 000. On 
assessment of her taxable income the Commissioner had included the profit on the sale of 
this property as profit of a revenue nature. The respondent had acquired the right of use of 
the property on 10 September 1973 through a written lease agreement with the Cape Town 
Municipality. The lease included the following terms:  
‘“(1) The lease commenced on 1 October 1973 and was for an initial period of one year where after 
it was subject to termination at any time by either party giving the other party one month’s notice in 
writing;  
(2) Upon the rental being in arrears for seven days or longer, the Council was entitled summarily to 
cancel the lease and eject the respondent; 
(3) On termination of the lease for any reason whatsoever, any improvements (whether necessary or 
otherwise) of the land would become the property of the Council without the payment of 





During December 1986, the respondent was informed that the property would be offered to 
her at a price of R228000. However recognising that many of the lessees had invested a lot 
of money by way of improvements to the properties, the Council amended the initial offer 
to the lessees. Despite objection to the initial resolution by the Municipality, a second 
resolution was passed on 24 May 1994, offering the lessees three choices. 
‘(a) to acquire the property (including the bungalow) at the price of R802 000; or  
(b) to enter into a new lease whereby she could carry on leasing the property for a period of 20 years. 
(This lease agreement would provide for a market-related monthly rental, determined every three 
years, together with an option whereby the lessee would be able to acquire the property at any time 
during the 20 year lease period at a determined market value and it would provide that the building 
structures and erections already existing on the land were the property of the Council and that any 
additional buildings, structures 
and erections which were in future erected on the land whether necessary or otherwise, would 
immediately upon their construction become the property of the Council without any payment of 
compensation); or  
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(c) To vacate the property in order to afford the Council an opportunity to sell it (together with the 





The taxpayer’s financial situation was such that she could not afford to buy the property 
which had been offered to her by the Municipality nor was she able to meet the expense of 
the market-related lease payments. At the time this offer was made by the Council a 
number of financial institutions approached the respondent offering her financial assistance, 
in order for her to acquire the property. Among these was Investec Bank ltd (‘Investec’) 
which offered to supply the respondent with bridging finance. ‘Bridging finance is a short 
term micro loan that is secured against a future income and is widely used in property 
transactions to overcome the obstacles presented by time delays.’
28
Usually bridging finance 
is procured by individuals who are selling a property; while the receipt of the proceeds on 
the sale of any property may be subject to certain conditions, like the completion of legal 
transfer of ownership; most individuals still have the task of meeting other immediate 
financial obligations. In such cases cash is needed straightaway to finance expenses such as 
estate agent fees, the deposit payable on a new property acquired, lawyers’ fees and transfer 
charges.
29
 Bridging finance allows those, to whom it is extended, the opportunity to meet 
their short-term obligations while they await a future source of income, such as the 
proceeds on the sale of property.  
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Using the finance which she had procured from Investec, the respondent purchased the 
property for R802000 and subsequently sold it in September of 1995 pursuant to an 
agreement she had made with Investec. The taxpayer objected to the inclusion of the profit 
on sale of the property in her taxable income as a receipt of a revenue nature and appealed 
to the Tax Court. On appeal from the Tax Court, the Full Court of the Cape of Good Hope 
Provincial Division upheld the respondent’s appeal against the judgment and order of the 
Cape Income Tax Special Court that the proceeds received by the taxpayer were of a capital 
nature. The Commissioner appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal with the leave of the 
Full Court, leave having been granted in terms of s 20 (4) (b) of the Supreme Court Act 59 
of 1959. 
 
The judgment laid down in the Supreme Court of Appeal rested primarily on the premise 
that the respondent’s actions, together with the agreement which she had made with 
Investec amounted to having embarked on a profit-making scheme. In addition, the court 
rejected the proposition that the lessee had any interest in the property as ‘The respondent’s 
counsel was unable to define the nature of the interest which the respondent allegedly had 




In order to reach any conclusion on the matter, there is one fundamental distinction which 
must be made. Was the profit on sale of the property in question, designedly sought for 
and/or earned in the course of carrying on a  business or conversely, was the respondent 
salvaging an asset to her best advantage?  
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A Scheme of Profit-Making: 
There have been a number of cases which have dealt with the issue of what constitutes a 
taxpayer having embarked on a scheme of profit-making, however Pick ‘n Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust has long been the authority on this issue. This judgment cited a 
number of cases as authority for the decision in that case, which are useful in assessing the 
facts of Wyner.  
 
In the judgment of Californian Copper Syndicate v Inland Revenue the Lord Justice Clerk 
highlighted the distinction which must be made in determining whether gains on the 
disposal of assets are capital or revenue in nature.  
‘What is the line which separates the two classes of cases may be difficult to define, and each case 
must be considered according to its facts, the question to be determined being, is the sum of gain that 
has been made a mere enhancement of value by realising a security, or is it, a gain, made by an 




The judgment went on to further separate the approach into that which must be adopted in 
ascertaining gains made by a company and those made by an individual, citing the 
judgment of Stratford JA in the case of Leydenberg Platinum, ‘A "business", so far as an 
individual taxpayer is concerned, is characterized by a series of transactions having an 
element of continuity, and usually performed in the contemplation of making a profit.’
32
 
With regard to the characteristics of a ‘business’, which an individual may embark on, 
namely that of continuity and having involved a series of transactions, reference was made 
to the case of Platt and Stott. The dicta laid down by Wessels JA in the case of Stott, in 
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determining whether the gains on the sale of various plots of land were to be considered 
capital or revenue stated,  
'If you are dealing with a company one of whose objects is to buy and sell land, then the company 
might well be considered to be doing the business of selling and buying land even though it carries 
out only a single transaction; but when an individual like a surveyor who is not professedly carrying 
on the occupation of a landjobber buys and sells one or more plots of land, he cannot be said prima 
facie to be doing the business of a landjobber. Before it can be said that an individual is carrying on a 




In the case of Platt the following principle was put forward, 'In the case of a company 
formed for certain purposes, the question of the continuity of the acts, which is another 
factor to be considered in deciding whether a business is carried on, is not of the same 




Thus, it is evident from the above that when it falls to determine the nature of a gain made 
on  the disposal of an asset, a different approach must be adopted in ascertaining the gains 
made by a company in comparison to those made by an individual. In casu the taxpayer did 
not trade in property and there was no continuity in her actions. Given the choices which 
had been made available to the taxpayer, after the resolution made by the Cape Town 
Municipality and in her financial situation, the respondent had no other option but to make 
use of the financial assistance which had been offered to her and acquire the property or 
risk losing her home by vacating the property.   
 
Watermayer CJ, said in the judgment laid down in the case of New State Areas, albeit in 
regard to the capital versus revenue distinction with reference to the nature of expenditure, 
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‘The conclusion to be drawn from all of these cases, seems to be that the true nature of each 
transaction must be enquired into in order to determine whether the expenditure attached to 
it is capital or revenue expenditure.’
35
 In the present case, the true nature of the transaction 
which saw the respondent obtaining finance and using it to acquire the property she had 
previously lived in, was that she had no other reasonable alternative, given the options 
available to her. The only way she was able to afford to purchase the property was because 
of the bridging finance which had been advanced by Investec. Both the options to purchase 
the property and reside there or to purchase and subsequently let the property were not 
financially viable, as she would not have been able to pay back the loan which allowed her 
to purchase the property in the first place. Thus the only option she had was to vacate the 
property or to use financial aid presented by Investec, to acquire the property and realise it. 
In his judgment Southwood AJA stated:  
‘The argument that the profit was not designedly sought for and worked for and was fortuitous 
cannot be accepted. A distinction must be drawn between the making of the discounted offer, which 
clearly was fortuitous, and the acquisition of the property for resale, which was anything but 
fortuitous. With the assistance of Investec the respondent devised a scheme whereby she could make 





With respect, the distinction which the learned judge fails to make here is that while the 
resale of the property and the profit earned as a result, was most certainly not fortuitous, the 
profit on sale had not been designedly sought out. While this may initially seem counter-
intuitive, it is important to note that while operations which may bear the hallmarks of 
trade, the most significant consideration in making the capital versus revenue distinction 
with regard to income earned, is whether these operations are accompanied and supported 
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by an intention and purpose to trade as was asserted in Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust. 
 
Given no other choice but to vacate the property she had resided in for more than 20 years, 
the respondent had no other option but to try and salvage the interest she had in the 
property. The respondent sought to sell the property in order that she could use the proceeds 
to both pay off the loan from Investec and in order to acquire another property to reside in, 
both of which she did upon the receipt of the proceeds on the sale. Her primary intention 
does not meet the criteria of continuity which Wessels JA described as having been 
required to show an individual is carrying on a business and in addition is absent from the 
respondents actions. 
 
The weight which is ascribed to intention with respect to matters of this nature, is 
highlighted in the judgment of SIR v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd, where it was held that, ‘[i]n 
an enquiry as to the intention with which a transaction was entered into for purposes of the 
law of income tax, a court of law is not concerned with the kind of subjective state of mind 
required for the purposes of criminal law, but rather with the purpose for which the 
transaction was entered into.’
37
 In support of this it is useful to consider the case of CIR v 
Paul, in which the taxpayer was taxed on the profit which he had earned on the sale of land 
that he had initially acquired but which was surplus to his needs. The taxpayer had 
expressed to the seller of the land, that he only wished to acquire between 30 and 40 acres 
of it however the seller would only agree to the sale of 167 acres. Initially the taxpayer had 
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entered into an agreement with his brother-in-law, to acquire a half-share of the 167 acres 
the seller was willing to dispose of, so that together they would be able to finance the 
acquisition of the full 167 acres. After coming into some money, the taxpayer had enough 
capital to finance the purchase of the full 167 acres on his own and following the purchase 
of  the land, he developed approximately 100 acres of it, which were in excess of his needs 
and sold them. After having appealed the inclusion of the profit on the sale of such land as 
having been revenue in nature, the Supreme Court of Appeal found that it is the taxpayer’s 
main or dominant purpose which must be considered, citing the case of Levy.38  
 
Just as the respondent in casu had done, the taxpayer in the case of Paul had acquired an 
asset which had been in excess of his needs. Mrs Wyner had purchased the property in casu 
to salvage the interest she had vested in it over time, as her primary residence and through 
the improvements she had effected on it, the value of which would pass to The Cape Town 
Municipality in the event that she chose to vacate the property. Given her financial 
circumstances the property was unaffordable and so in order to recover her interest, she had 
to invoke the assistance of a loan, which could only be paid off and which would have only 
been advanced to her on condition that the property was sold. Her dominant intention in 
acquiring the property had not been to attain the highest profit possible on sale and then go 
on to purchase more property, as is customary for a trader. Instead her intention was to 
recover the interest in what had been her primary residence for more than 20 years and to 
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use the proceeds to meet the obligation of the loan extended to her and to purchase a 
smaller residence elsewhere.  
 
This distinction was highlighted ubiquitously in the case of Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust by both Smalberger JA in his majority judgment and by Nicholas AJA in 
his dissenting judgment.The facts regarding the extent of Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share 
Purchase Trust’s dealings are as follows,  
‘It was part of the duties of the trustees inter alia to subscribe for or purchase shares in the capital of 
Stores in accordance with the provisions of the scheme; to seek applications from eligible applicants 
for the purchase of such shares and to sell them to such applicants; and to administer the scheme in 
order to achieve and maintain the objects stated in paragraph 1.1. The price payable by participants 
for scheme shares was in practice the middle market price on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange at 
the time of acceptance of the application concerned.’ 
39
    





Nicholas AJA in his dissenting judgment asserts,  
‘...a distinction is drawn between the carrying on of a business and the pursuance of a profit-making 
scheme. The basis for such distinction is that it is more appropriate to refer to a profit-making 
scheme where a single transaction is involved. I accept that a series of transactions is characteristic 
of the carrying on of a business. But irrespective of the number of transactions, whether the receipts 
that flow from the carrying on of a business are revenue still depends on whether the business was 
conducted with a profit making purpose, i e as part of a profit-making venture or scheme. To hold 
otherwise would amount to a departure from the earlier authorities – something clearly never 
intended in either the Natal Estates or Elandsheuwel Farming cases.’ 
 
The respondent had been approached by a financial institution which would assist in her in 
salvaging her personal interest in the property and after she had successfully sold the 
property, she went on to acquire another smaller property to reside in and invested the 
surplus funds. These actions are contrary to those which would be customary for an 
individual who traded in properties. Given the large profit she had earned on sale and the 
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bridging finance she had used to acquire the property, she had every opportunity to enter 
into the same transaction with Investec to acquire more property but she did not, entirely in 
line with her objective of acquiring a reliable place to stay. Southwood JA, in his judgment 
stated;  
‘The fact that the respondent acquired a cheaper residence in the same area with the proceeds of the 
sale does not alter the revenue nature of the purchase and sale of the property. The character of the 
proceeds from the sale of the property is determined by whether the property was purchased and held 
for investment or for resale. If the second and cheaper property were in the future to be sold, the 
character of the proceeds of that sale would be determined by assessing whether the respondent 




With respect, this approach, failed to take into consideration the significance which had 
been assigned to the characteristics of continuity and the premise that for an individual to 
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The cases of Wyner and Founders Hill are tasked with making the capital versus revenue 
distinction and in addition both are concerned with determining the nature of income 
earned on the disposal of an asset, which is acquired for the purpose of resale. While the 
law surrounding the capital versus revenue distinction is fundamentally ambiguous, this 
holds true for a reason. There exists no one true definition of what constitutes income of a 
capital nature, which can be applied to all circumstances because to use one definition 
would amount to a failure to recognise the complexity of the distinction. The capital versus 
revenue distinction, as a feature of income in the context of tax law is so complex because 
it is ever-evolving. As the intricacy of commercial transactions increase, so the law on this 
matter must develop and thus to apply one single definition or principle in order to make 
the distinction between capital and revenue amounts, in every situation would amount to a 
failure to identify these intricacies.  
Since the inception of capital gains tax in the South Africa, a multitude of judgments have 
given rise to case law on the matter. The capital and revenue distinction is a unique one in 
that, even within the case law which is tasked with deciphering it, there are no decisive tests 
to determine one from the other. This was first set out in the judgment of Wessels JA in the 
case of Stott, one of the earliest cases involving the capital and revenue distinction, which is 
still cited widely today. 
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This is idea was further highlighted in the case of Natal Estates, another leading judgment 
on the matter in which Holmes JA stated; 
Important considerations include, inter alia, the intention of the owner, both at the time of buying the 
land and when selling it (for his intention may have changed in the interim); the objects of the owner, 
if a company; the activities of the owner in relation to his land up to the time of deciding to sell it in 
whole or in part; the light which such activities throw on the owner's ipse dixit as to intention; where 
the owner sub-divides the land, the planning, extent, duration, nature, degree, organisation and 
marketing operations of the enterprise; and the relationship of all this to the ordinary commercial 
concept of carrying on a business or embarking on a scheme for profit. Those considerations are not 




In Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, one of the principal cases on what is 
legally considered having embarked on a ‘scheme of profit-making,’ this premise was again 
emphasised when Nicholas AJA very succinctly stated; 
‘The problems to which the expressions receipts "of a capital nature" and expenditure "not of a 
capital nature" give rise are perennial and have generated a large number of decided cases, but the 
tests therein enunciated are not to be regarded as either prescriptive or comprehensive: they do no 
more than provide guidelines for the solution of the problems which arise. Ultimately each case must 




All three judges affirm the premise, that while there are numerous considerations which 
must be made in distinguishing the nature of gross income, no one factor is decisive. 
However despite this, a number of tests have been developed over time which give 
guidance on how best to approach the task of making the distinction. While these tests are 
most certainly useful and in many cases decisive in making the distinction, uncertainty 
arises in applying these tests uniformly. This is because before one can ascertain which 
tests should be applied, the most relevant factors to be considered, given the contention 
which has arisen, must be determined. Only once the most relevant factors for 
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consideration have been selected can the appropriate test be applied to the facts. This is 
where an important judgment must be made and this is one area where uncertainty arises. 
While early cases on the capital versus revenue distinction such as Stott, Paul and John Bell 
and Co, are still cited often in defense or attack of a certain position, modern day 
commercial dealings have become so complex that the principles underlying each of these 
cases, can often get distorted in the facts surrounding the convoluted commercial 
transactions. In addition, among the many different tests and facts for consideration, what 
one may consider as important in coming to a conclusion, another may not, also leading to 
uncertainty in the outcome of litigation on the subject.  
 
Generally the terms objective and intention are used to describe what a person does, 
whereas the words the word motive is used to explain why a person does something. The 
importance with which these two factors have been assigned has varied in different cases. 
In the Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust case Nicholas AJA, in his judgment, 
distinguished between the business’ object and its motive stating, ‘A distinction is to be 
drawn between the raison d' être of the scheme and the scheme in action - between the 
overall purpose of the scheme and the transactions performed in executing it.’
45
 Contrary to 
this in the case of CIR v Paul, Centlivers CJ stated;  
‘There seems no room for reasonable doubt that the appellant's intention in acquiring the property 
originally was what he has stated in evidence, and, that being so, we are unanimously of the view 
that he intended to make a capital investment. We are also satisfied that, at all relevant times his 
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The above is an example of how in one case, namely Paul, the words object and motive are 
used interchangeably, whereas in the case of Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust, a 
distinction is made between them and so the two cases produce contrary outcomes.
47
 While 
it may be appropriate to adopt one approach rather than the other in certain circumstances, 
implementing one approach instead of the other may lead to counter-intuitive outcome, in 
principle, as is seen in the case of Wyner. 
 
This distinction between motive and intention again arises, in a different form in the case of 
Founders Hill, where Lewis JA distinguishes the intention and purpose of Founders Hill in 
disposing of the land it had acquired, from the intention and purpose of its parent company 
AECI. In doing this, it is concluded that the nature of the land which was acquired by 
Founders Hill, from AECI was in-fact stock-in-trade, despite it being common cause 
between the parties that what was acquired, was a capital asset. In addition, in the judgment 
laid down by Lewis JA, a distinction was made between the facts surrounding other 
reported cases on realisation companies, including Berea West and for this reason, the 
principle laid down in Berea West was not seen to be appropriate to apply to Founders Hill. 
In the paper entitled ‘NWK and Founders Hill’, this distinction is highlighted as follows,  
‘In treating the proceeds on the disposal of assets by a realisation company as being of capital nature, 
the Courts in Berea West, Malone Trust et al were simply applying the basic principle, the golden 
rule that holds that if there is no trading for profit there can be no trading stock. This has nothing to 
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While the interpretation of intention versus motive may have been significant to the 
outcome of in each case, the interpretation of the law was also imperative to have come to 
the conclusion each judge did. The approach adopted in the case of Founders Hill was 
literal, some may even say excessively so. The reasoning supporting the judgment laid 
down leads to the premise that by distinguishing any case on the basis of a certain premise, 
even one which may not be correct, an alternative outcome may be found. While this may 
indeed be appropriate in certain circumstances, if a minor difference in the facts is used to 
distinguish, what is in principle the same thing, contrary outcomes may prevail, to the 
detriment of certainty.  
 
This difference in approach is the result of a difference in perspective on whether the law 
relating to a case, should be interpreted literally or whether consideration should be given 
an equitable and literal interpretation. In his consideration of the facts of Wyner, Counsel 
for respondent expressed the significance of this distinction in his appeal, noting; 
‘The choice faced by this court is whether to adopt a narrow approach which focuses mainly on the 
purpose of purchasing the property with the intention of selling it some 12 months later and the sale 
thereof, or to adopt a broader approach which takes into account the fact that the respondent had 
occupied the property for more than 20 years as well as the fact that the respondent bought and sold 
the property some 12 months later in the context of her prior occupation as lessee, who had an 




To say that by merely by challenging the correctness of a decision made by the SCA, 
uncertainty and inequity exists in the South African Tax regime would be amiss. However 
the complex nature of the capital revenue distinction opens up its legal interpretation to 
obfuscation. Therefore it is the middle ground between having regard to the variable, 
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indefinite distinction between capital and revenue and the notion that an efficient tax 
system should be one which bears characteristics such as certainty, simplicity and equity, 
which should be sought. Smalberger JA said in his judgment of Pick ‘n Pay Employee 
Share Purchase Trust; 
‘There are a variety of tests for determining whether or not a particular receipt is one of a revenue or 
capital nature. They are laid down as guidelines only - there being no single infallible test of 
invariable application. In this respect I agree with the following remarks of Friedman J in ITC 1450 
(at 76) "But when all is said and done, whatever guideline one chooses to follow, one should not be 
led to a result in one's classification of a receipt as income or capital which is, as I have had occasion 
previously to remark, contrary to sound commercial and good sense."’
50 
 
Therefore it cannot be said that the South African tax system or any other for that matter, is 
poorer for not having defined the term ‘amounts of a capital nature’ or not having 
distinguished it from ‘amounts of a revenue nature’. Indeed it is all the better for it. It has 
been said that, ‘things should be made as simple as possible, but not any simpler’
51
 and the 
same holds true for the capital versus revenue distinction. To simplify what is in essence a 
multifaceted subject would be to the detriment of equity, in that a single definition, when 
applied to a variety of circumstances may yield a legally incorrect result. Thus in terms of 
what Adam Smith termed the canons of taxation, it is fitting that the capital versus revenue 
distinction has been left to the mercy of the Courts which preside over it. It will continue to 
hold true for as along matters of tax are litigated, that the correctness of decisions laid down 
will be probed and challenged. However with regard to the cases of Wyner and Founders 
Hill, both seem to contradict one of the most fundamental traits of both taxation and law, 
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that of equity. In both instances the substance of what had actually occurred was hidden by 
a clouding of the law and the facts in relation to the law and it is these cases which are 
bound to muster uncertainty and which allow for what Adam Smith termed to ‘aggravate 
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